The information people store  securely on their mobile devices (e.g. passwords and PIN codes) not only needs to be stored confidentially, its availability must be protected as well. The confidentiality benefits if the data is not replicated. For example,  even if your password is weak, but an attacker has no access to data encrypted with the password, the password weakness does not assist him.
On the other hand, the availability benefits from replication: if you store the only copy of your data on a device and the device is broken, the data is no longer available. To harmonize the confidentiality and the availability can be a challenge that is easy to fail. Consider the recent case of the extremely popular BlackBerry device.
According to ElcomSoft CEO Vladimir Katalov: All data transmitted between a BlackBerry Enterprise Server and BlackBerry smartphones is encrypted with a highly secure AES or Triple DES algorithm. Unique private encryption keys are generated in a secure, two-way authenticated environment and are assigned to each BlackBerry smartphone user. Even more, to secure information stored on BlackBerry smartphones, password authentication can be made mandatory through the policies of a BlackBerry Enterprise Server (default, password authentication is limited to ten attempts, after which the smartphone’s wiped clean with all its contents erased).
Backup encryption uses AES with a 256-bit key. So far, so good. An AES key is derived from the user-supplied password, and this is where the problem arises.
In short, standard key-derivation function, PBKDF2, is used in a very strange way, to say the least. Where Apple has used 2,000 iterations in iOS 3.x, and 10,000 iterations in iOS 4.x, BlackBerry uses only one. Another significant shortcoming is that it’s BlackBerry Desktop Software that encrypts data, not the BlackBerry device itself. This means that the data is passed from the device to the computer in a plain, unencrypted form.
There are two problems: the small iteration counter and the exporting of unencrypted data. The main purpose of PBKDF is to slow down the bruteforce attacks by using a large iteration counter and thus by using only one iteration the protection is effectively defeated.
The second problem is probably even more severe while its effect is not that obvious. The usual network security model is that the network is insecure while the endpoints are secure. Historically this was the case, but currently the security situation on the most the most commonly used desktop OS is so bad, that an antivirus is considered a must. In the modern world a security-cautious user knows that he cannot be sure who really “0wns” his desktop, and may decide to keep his the most confidential data on a mobile device.
Apparently, the BlackBerry’s backup procedure renders this strategy ineffective – an attacker who “0wns” user’s desktop gets all the mobile device secrets as well.
